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noticeable number of North Dakota lawyers will utilize the new rule
and advertise. As North Dakota becomes more populated and more
urbanized, however, the opportunities for advertising may become
important and useful to both the lawyer and the consumer.

MICHAEL

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COURTS-ALL
ERNED B.

A.

CAMPBELL

STATE COURT JURISDICTION

Gov-

"MINIMUM CONTACTS"

Plaintiff filed a shareholder's derivative suit against Greyhound
Corporation, Greyhound Lines, Inc., and twenty-eight present or former corporate officers and directors.' In conjunction with the filing
of the shareholder's derivative suit plaintiff filed a motion for the sequestration 2 of the property of defendants located in DelawareS
The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the procedure of the Delaware
sequestration statute.4 On appeal to the United States Supreme
I.

Plaintiff was a nonresident of Delaware. Greyhound Corporation was incorporated
under the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business In Phoenix, Arizona.
Greyhound's wholly owned subsidiary, Greyhound Lines, Inc., was incorporated in California. and had its princilial place of business in Phoenix, Arizona. None of the twentyeight present or forner corporate officers or directors were residents of Delaware. Tile
actions, upon which the shareholder derivative suit was based', occurred In Oregon.
2. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1975). This is the Delaware sequestration statute. It allows a Delaware court to seize any or all property of a nonresident defendant in order
to compel appearance. The property may be sold under the order of the court, if the defendant does not appear or otherwise defaults, to pay the demand of the plaintiff. If the
defendant enters a general appearance, he may upon notice to the plaintiff petition the
court for release of tile property. It appears from the Delaware statute that the defendant
may either default and lose the property or make a general appearance and submit himself in full to in personala jurisdiction.
3. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1975). This statute places the situs of stock, of corporations incorporated in Delaware, In Delaware. The Court of Chancery attached such stock
as defendants owned In Greyhound Corporation pursuant to DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366
(1975). Delaware Is the only state which has the situs of stock in the state of incorporation; this makes Delaware the situs of a great deal of corporate stock. The other fortynine states have adopted U.C.C. § 8-317 (1)
(1972 version), which states as follows:
Attachment or levy upon security (1)
No attachment or levy upon a securIty or any share or other interest evidenced thereby which is outstanding
shall be valid until the security Is actually seized by the officer making the
attachment or levy but a security which has been surrendered to the issuer
may be attached or levied upon at the source.
This statute Is found at N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-08-33 (1968).
4. Greyhound Corporation v. Meitner, 'el.-,
361 A.2d 225 (1976).
Appellants
contended that the sequestration procedure did not accord them due process, that the
property seized was not capable of attachment in Delaware, and that they did not have
sufficient contacts with Delaware to sustain jurisdiction of that state's cour's under the
rule of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See infra notes 14-17,
anld text accompanying.
Trihe DelawaIre Snulolenie (Olrit, in rejecting alIellants' contentions, stated as follows:
(Jlurisdlction under
366 remains, as it was In 1963, quasi fit ren founded
on the presence of capital stock here, not on prior contacts by defendants
vitl tills foriill. [i lder 8 1)l. C1. § 1(;9 tile "sitis of tihe ownership of tile (apital stock of all corporations existlncr tinder the laws of this State . . . (is) In
this State," and that prov ides ile
initial hais
for jurisdiction.
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Court, the Delaware court was reversed. 5 The issue addressed by
the Court was whether the sequestration statute as applied in this
case violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.8
The Court, in addressing this issue, held that all assertions of state
court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the "minimum contacts" standard set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington and
its progeny. 7 Shaffer v. Heitner, U.S., 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
At common law jurisdiction was based upon presence or consent,
and this formed the basis for jurisdiction within the United States.8
The United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Pennoyer
v. Neff9 set out the standard by which state court jurisdiction could
be exercised. In Pennoyer the Court stated that a state had the power
to exercise jurisdiction over persons and property within its boundaries. 10 The in rem" aspect of Pennoyer was later expanded to include
intangibles in the case of Harris v. Balk. 2 In Harris the Court held
that a debt, although an intangible, was property upon which jurisdiction could be based under Pennoyer.13
Del. at , 361 A.2d at 229. Legal scholars have found, other reasons for Delaware's
sequestration statute. See Folk & Sloyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A Constitutional
Analysis, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 797 n.269 (1973).
5. U.S., 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
6. The Court did not consider appellants' second contention, which was whether the
property seized was capable of attachment in Delaware. 97 S.Ct. at 2572.
7. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Tie Court, in Shaffer v. Heitner, unanimously held that-minimum contacts should apply to all state court jurisdiction. 97 S. Ct. at 2684-85. Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr. Justice
Powell concurred because of reservations corcerning real property. 97 S.Ct. at 25S7.
Mr. Justice Stevens,
in
concurring, agreed that there was
no adequate basis for the assertion of jurisdiction and that the Delaware statute was unconstitutional
on its face, but concutrred because lie believed tile Court decided more than was necessary
to dispose of the case. Id. at 2587-88. Mr. Justice Brennan concurred and dissented. Id. at
2588. See infra' notes 39-41, and text accompanying.
8. Note, Developments in tie
Low State-Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909,
917 (1960).
9. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
10. 'Mr. Justice Field, writing for the majority in I'euaoyer, stated as follows:
One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. Every State
owes protection to its own citizens; and, when non-residents deal with them,
it Is a legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold and appropriate any
property owned by such non-residents to satisfy the claims of its citizens.
Id. at 722-23.
11. There are three types of in rem actions True in rem actions are those In which the
Judgment only affects the title or status of the property. See, e.g., American Land Co. v.
Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911): iuling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559
(1889) ; Housing Authority v. Bjork, 109 Mont. 552, 98 P.2d 324 (1940) ; In re Estate of
Nilson, 126 Neb. 541, 253 N.WV. 675 (1934). True in rem actions are said to be good
against the world. There are also two types of actions which are referred to as quasi
In rem. One is similar to the true in rem actions but involves only the Interests of certain
known defendants. See, e.g., Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 1.5 (1,R86) ; Gas.sert v. Strong,
38 Mont. 18, 98 P. 497 (1908), appeal dismissed, 215 U.S. 583 (1909). Tile other type of
quasi in ren action involves a non-resident defendant who has property In the state. Sea,
e.g., Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). The property is attached and then a claim Is
litigated which does not In any way concern the property. If the plaintiff prevails he may
satisfy his claim out of the defendant's property. See slipra note 8, at 949.
12. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
13. The Court in Harris, a garnishment action, decided that the situs of tile debt was
In any state in which the garnishee could he found. But this type of action also depen'id
upon whether the law of the state permitted the debtor to he garnished and also that the
court acquire jurisdiction over the garnishee through his voluntary appearance, or by
actual sprvice of process upon him within the state. Id.
at 222, 226. The Restatement
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In 1945 the in personam aspect of Pennoyer was destroyed in the
case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.1 4 The basis for jurisdiction was announced in International Shoe to be "minimum contacts."' 5 The underlying principle of the minimum contacts test was
that if an individual or corporation had some contact with the state,
and an obligation arose out of or was connected with the activities
within the state, then the individual or corporation would be required
to respond to a suit brought to enforce the obligation in that state."6
After International Shoe the in rem aspect of Pennoyer remained
7

intact.1
The minimum contacts criteria of International Shoe have been
further defined." The latest test concerning minimum contacts was
espoused by the Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla.' 9 In Hanson
the Court indicated that a defendant must have such contacts with a
state that it can be said it has been benefited and protected by the
0
laws of that state.2
The courts have stated that the test for what constitutes minimum contacts is not simple and mechanical.1 Rather, the cases
should be carefully scrutinized to see if the facts of the case are such
that the defendant can be said to have had "minimum contacts"
with that forum.
The minority view prior to Shaffer v. Heitner,22 that in rem jurisdiction should also be based upon minimum contacts, was esview as to in rem jurisdiction is also based upon Pennoyer and Harris. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §9 59, 60, 68 (1971) ; but see comment a to §§ 59, 60,
68.
14.
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
15. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the majority, stated the minimum contacts test as
follows:
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within it state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of
that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and,
so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a
suit brought to enforce them can, in most Instances, hardly be said to be
undue.
Id. at 319.
16. Id.
17. Judge Gibbons discusses the question of why International Shoe was not applied to
In rem actions as well as in personam actions in Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank of the
City of New York, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976). He appears to come to the conclusion
that just because International Shoe dealt with In personam jurisdiction everyone assumed the decision only affected in personam actions. Id. at 1132-33. The Court in Heitaer
noted that there had been indications that the collapse of the personam aspect of
Pcnnoer
did not leave that decision unweakened as a foundation for in rem jurisdiction.
97 S. Ct. at 2580.
18. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., '55 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Perkins v. Bengliet
Consolidate(T Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952): Travelers Health Association v. Virginia,
339 U.S. 643 (1950). But see Hanson v. Denckla, 257 U.S. 235 (195S).
19. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
20. The Court In Hanson stated "that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
InvokInr the benefits and protections of its laws." Id. at 253.
21. Shaffer v_ Hei'ner. ...
, 57
9 S.Ct. 2-;9. 2580 11977) : Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 2? 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d, 761 .(1961) ; Hebron. Brick
Co. v. Robinson Brick & Tile Company, 234 N.%V M 251, 256-57 (N.D. 1975).
22. 97 S. Ct. at 2580-q1,
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poused mainly by legal scholars and a few state courts and lower
federal courts. 2. Judge Gibbons, of the third circuit, stated this minority view by ;saying that the exercise of judicial power should be
based upon respect for the values of the federal system and fairness
to the parties, rather than the presence of property within the forum. 24 Some states, while not adopting this view, have not had to

rely heavily on in rem jurisdiction. Rather they assert all jurisdiction

25
based upon a long-arm statute.

While the Supreme Court in Heitner does hold that the law of
in rem jurisdiction no longer stands securely upon the foundation of
Pennoyer, they do indicate that the presence of property in the state
may provide the necessary contacts among the forum state, the26defendant, and the litigation to meet the minimum contacts test.

It

appears that the Court, in dictum, gives a test for when property
within the state may be sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction. 2
The defendant's actions indicating his expectation to benefit from the
state's protection of his interest, the strength of the state's interest,
and the convenience of the parties, as to witnesses and records,
should be considered. 28
Property alone, whether tangible or intangible, without the existence of other contacts between the defendant, the state and the litigation, could not be the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. 29
23. See, e.g., Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank of the City of New York, 530 F.2d 1123,
1130-43 (3d Cir. 1976), where the third circuit declared Pennsylvania's foreign attachment procedure unconstitutional; Bekins v. Huish, 1 Ariz. App. 258, 401 P.2d 743 (1965),
where the court granted specific performance of an agreement to convey real estate situated in Arizona, rendered after default was taken against the landowner who was served
with summons and complaint by registered mail; Caxnire v. Scieszka, N.H., 358
A.2d 397 (1976), where the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that where a New Hampshire plaintiff sought recovery from a Missouri defendant for injuries sustained in an automobile accident in Connecticut, attachment of defendant's liability in New Hampshire was
insufficient to invoke the quasi in. rem juris iction of the New Hampshire court. See Von
Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. Rsv.
1121 (1966) ; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REv. 657 (1959).
This view is that minimum contacts should govern a state's power to adjudicate personal
rights as to property located in the state. The underlying premise of this view is the
rejection of Pennoyer. The proponents of this view believe that a proceeding against
property is a proceeding against the owner of that property. Because the proceeding is
against the owner jurisdiction should be based upon "minimum contacts" rather than
where the property is located.
24. Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank of the City of New York, 530 F.2d 1123, 1132 (3d
Cir. 1976).
25. A long-arm statute Is a procedural rule which allows a state to exercise jurisdiction
over a person or entity even though that entity or person is not physically present in that
state. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 543.19
(West Supp. 1977); W s. STAT. ANN. § 801.05 (West 1977) ; N.D.R. Civ. P. 4(b) (2)
stated that the need for in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction has been reduced because
(1974). In the revision notes
following Vis. STAT. ANN. § 801.07 (West 1977)
it is
stated that the need for in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction has been reduced because
of the extension of personal jurisdiction provided for in § 801.05, which is Wisconsin's
long-arm statute.
26. 97 S. Ct. at 2582. The Court here discusses situations in which the presence of
property may be sufficient minimum contacts. But they also say as follows: "We do not
suggest that these Illustrations include all the factors that may affect the decision, nor
that the factors we have mentioned are necessarily decisive." Id. at n.28.
27. Id. at 2582.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2583. Actions which the Supreme Court appears most concerned with are
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The Court in Heitner looked at three reasons which historically
have been used to justify in rem jurisdiction. First, the Court dismissed the argument that in rem actions prevent a person from moving his property to evade his creditors. The creditors can enforce a
judgment, once obtained, in any jurisdiction in which the debtor has
property.3 0 Second, the Court dismissed the assertion that by allowing
in rem jurisdiction the uncertainty of InternationalShoe was avoided.
Simplifying litigation by avoiding the jurisdictional question may be
at the sacrifice of fair play and substantial justice. 3 1 Third, the Court
looked at the long history of jurisdiction based solely upon property.
The Court stated that traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice could be as offended by the continuation of ancient procedures
which are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures
32
which are inconsistent with our constitutional heritage.
After finding that all state court jurisdiction must be based upon
minimum contacts, the Court looked to see if Delaware could assert
jurisdiction based upon minimum contacts. First, appellee contended
that Delaware should be allowed to assert jurisdiction over appellants
because Delaware had an interest in supervising the management of
a Delaware corporation and that appellants had performed the acts
required by Hanson v. Denckla.3 3 In rejecting this argument the
Court said while Delaware may have an interest in the action so that
Delaware law may apply, this does not mean that Delaware may
automatically assert jurisdiction over appellants.3 4 The Court said
the issue here was personal jurisdiction. This is resolved by considering the acts of the appellants. 3 5 Here the appellants did not demonstrate that they had purposely availed themselves of the privilege of
3 6
doing business in the forum state.
those in which the plaintiff brings the action against assets or property which have no
relation to the action. In reference to this type of action the Court stated as follows:
note that this type of case also presents the clearest Illustration of the argument
"[We
in favor of assessing assertions of jurisdiction by a single standard." Id.
The Supreme Court makes the point that if a direct assertion of personal jurisdiction would be unconstitutional an indirect assertion should also be impermissible. Id.
30. 97 S. Ct. at 2583. The Court seems to be saying that a debtor can move his property
from a state. But if he does his creditors still have a cause of action which can be brought
in a forum where he is subject to In personam jurisdiction. This will then be enforceable
in all the states.

31.

Id. at 25S4.

32. Id.

33. See supra note 20.
34. 97 S. Ct. at 2586. The Court admits that Delaware may have an interest in the
action because a corporation incorporated in Delaware is involved. But this fact would
only allow Delaware law to apply, and this does not mean that Delaware may assert
Jurisdiction over these defendants. To assert jurisdiction Delaware had to show that these
defendants had performed the acts required 1i, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)
it failed to do this. Therefore it woi,ld appear that the contacts needed so that a state
may assert

jurisd'ction

over a

defendant

must

be nore

than

the contacts

needed'

in

order

to have that state's laww apply.
35. Hanson .v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1958), cited with approval In Shaffer v.
, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 25,q( (1977).
U.S.-,
Iteitner, 36. The acts of appellants here were the acceptance of positions as officers or directors
of a Delaware C'orporntlnn. 97 S. Ct. at 256.
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Second, appellee contended that appellants had minimum contacts with Delaware because of the ownership of stock in a Delaware
corporation. The Court did not believe that the purchase of such
stock should make the appellants subject to Delaware's courts.3 7 Appellants' relation to Delaware was not such that it could be said they
had purposely availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state.38
Justice Brennan, in dissenting, after considering minimum contacts, would have allowed Delaware to assert jurisdiction over these
appellants.3 9 There are three interrelated policies which Justice Brennan believed would justify an assertion of jurisdiction by Delaware
over these appellants: (1) the state had a substantial interest in providing restitution for its local corporations that allegedly have been
victimized by fiduciary misconduct; (2) the action was centered in an
area in which the forum state possessed a manifest regulatory interest; and (3) the state had an interest in providing a convenient
forum for supervising and overseeing the affairs of an entity that
was purely the creation of that state's laws. 40 Justice Brennan believed it was very important that appellants had voluntarily associ-

ated themselves with the state and had thereby invoked the benefits

41
and protections of its laws.
Heitner may have some effect on North Dakota law. There is
a case in which the North Dakota Supreme Court followed Harris
v. Balk, that may no longer be good law.4 2 North Dakota also has
37. Id.
38. Id., citing Hanson v. Denckla, 257 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
39. Justice Brennan dissented because he did not believe it was proper for the Court
to address the Issue of minimum contacts. 97 S. Ct. at 258. Justice Brennan stated two
considerations which should have kept the Court from looking into minimum contacts:
(1) it was not discussed at the trial level and therefore an incomplete record was before
the court; and (2) the court should use restraint in making decisions requiring constitutional pronouncements. Id. at 2589.
Justice Brennan states that he would not be as rigid as the majority in distinguishing between jurisdiction and choice of law. Id. at 2591. See supra note 34. Justice
Brennan puts forth two reasons why the tests for jurisdiction and choice of law should
be brought closer together. The first reason is that inquiries into choice of law and jurisdiction are often closely related and to a certain degree depend upon the same circumstances. The main similarity is that they both depend upon contacts between the contrOversy, the parties, and the forum state. The second' reason is what Justice Brennan refers
to as practical considerations. Justice Brennan argues that if a court is forced to apply
another state's law that court will feel less knowledgeable and comfortable in interpreting,
and less interested in fostering the policies of the foreign jurisdiction. Justice Brennan believes that when a state has a substantial interest in. seeing its own law applied it would
be wise to adopt a liberal view of jurisdiction, unless considerations of fairness or efficiency dictate otherwise. 97 S. Ct. at 2591.
40. Id. at 2590.
41. Id. at 2592. One of the important differences between the majority and Justice
Brennan is that the majority seems concerned because sequestration can. be used against
anyone, while it appears that Justice Brennan would allow the Delaware courts to interpret their statute so that it would apply only to those who have had minimum contacts.
Id. at 2589.
42. See Bingenheimer Mercantile Co. v. Weber, 49 N.D. 912, 191 N.W. 620 (1922).
Bingenheimer involved a garnishment, and because of recent developmPnts in that area
of the law that part of the case may have been previously overruled. That part of the
opinion which is pertinent here is that the North Dakota Supreme Court cited the jurisdictional principle espoused by the United States Supreme Court in 1-TarriR v. Balk, 198
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a rule which allows the seizure of property by a court, 43 which may
no longer be constitutional after Heitner.4 4 This rule does not appear to be widely used. 45 Rather, it appears that courts rely on
46
North Dakota's broad long-arm statute.
One section of the North Dakota long-arm statute, North Dakota
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) (2) (6), which allows North Dakota
courts to assert jurisdiction over a person if he has accepted a position as an officer or director of a North Dakota corporation, may not
be in compliance with Heitner. The Court in Heitner stated that by
accepting positions as officers or directors of a Delaware corporation

appellants had not performed the acts required by Hanson.47 Therefore, if the only contact a defendant had with North Dakota was the
acceptance of a position as an officer or director of a North Dakota
corporation, North Dakota could perhaps not assert jurisdiction over
U.S. 215 (1905). This principle was that a debt was property upon which quasi in, rei
jurisdiction could be based. 49 N.D. at 317, 191 N.W. at 621-22. After Heitner it does not
appear, that a debt, without any other contacts, can be used as a basis for state court
jursdiction. 97 S.Ct. at 2583.
43. N.D.R. Civ. P. 64 (1974), Seizure of Property, states as follows:
At the commencement of and during the course of an action., all remedies
providing for seizure of property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of
the Judgment ultimately to be entered in the action are available under the
circumstances and in the manner provided by the law of this state existing
at the time the remedy is sought.
44. If this rule is interpreted to allow the holding of property as security for a judgment which is being litigated in a forum consistent with hiternational Shoe, it may be in
compliance with Heitner. The Court in Heitner indicated its consent to the seizure of
property to hold as security for an action being litigated in a forum consistent with International Shoe. 97 S. Ct. at 2583.
45. The fact that this rule is not widely used is evidenced by the fact that there are
no annotations to North Dakota cases following this rule. Rather, all the annotations are
to American Law Reports.
46. N.D.R. Civ. P. 4.(b) (2) (Supp. 1977) states as follows:
A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who
acts directly or by an agent as to any claim for relief arising from the person's
(A) transacting any business in this state;
(B) contracting to supply or supplying services, goods, or other things
in this state;
(C) committing a tort within or without this state causing injury to
another person or property within this state;
(D) committing a tort within this state causing injury to another person
or property within or without this state;
(E) owning, having any interest in, using, or possessing property in this
state ;
(F) contracting to insure another person, property, or other risk within
this state;
(G)acting as a, director, manager, trustee, or officer of a corporation
organized under the laws of, or having its principal place of business within,
this state: or
(H) enjoying any other status or capacity within this state, including cohabitation, or engaging in any other activity having such contact with this
state that the exercise of personal juris.diction over him does not offend against
traditional notions of justice or fair play or the due process of law.
The due process considerations which must be applied by North Dakota courts In cases
involving the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction were cited by the North Dakota Supreme
Court In Hebron Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick & Tile Co., 234 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1975).
These considerations are as follows: (1) the nature and onality of the contacts: (2) the
quantity of contacts: (3) the relation between the cause of action and the contacts; (4)
the state's interest in providing a forum for its residents: and (5) the convenience of the
parties. Id. at 256, citing Caesar's World, Inc. v. Spencer Foods, Inc., 498 F.2d 1176, 1180
(8th Cir. 1974).
47. 97 S. Ct. at 25,86.
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that defendant after Heitner.48
The Supreme Court has made the law of in rem jurisdiction comport with fairness and substantial justice rather than the mere happenstance of a res within a forum. Now that the idea of searching
for a res upon which to base jurisdiction seems no longer needed the
courts can evaluate the real factors upon which jurisdiction should
be asserted, i.e., minimum contacts.
LAWRENCE D. DuBois

CONTRACTS-SALES-BUY-IN

NOTICE INVALIDATES RIGHT TO DEMAND
SHIPMENT OF GRAIN SO THAT ALLEGED FACTS MAY CONSTITUTE A DEFENSE OF ECONOMIC DURESS

Appellant contracted on February 1, 1973, to sell 30,000 bushels
of barley to the appellee at $1.22 per bushel. Shipment was to be
made during March and April. Appellant shipped only 3,734 bushels
during that time, contending that appellee had not fulfilled its part
of the bargain.1 The parties attempted to negotiate their differences
over the next few months. Finally, after giving appellant a thirty
day notice, appellee, on November 8, 1973, wrote to appellant informing him that appellee had found it necessary to buy in from the
open market the remaining balance of barley that appellant failed to
ship and that it was charging appellant for the difference between
the market price at that time and the contract price. 2 On November
16, 1973, appellant replied by repudiating the contract, disagreeing
with appellee's version of the contract, and denying any liability.
Appellee continued its demand for shipment and finally, on February 18, 1974, during a phone conversation with appellant, appellee
convinced appellant to ship the remaining balance of barley. During
the next seven weeks the barley was shipped. Appellant then brought
suit,8 alleging that appellant had shipped the barley under economic
48. But It also appears that the Supreme Court sanctions long-arm statutes which treat
the acceptance of a position as an officer or director of a domestic corporation as consent to the jurisdiction of that state's courts. Id.
1. Appellant claimed that appellee had agreed to supply twenty to twenty-five trucks to
ship the grain. The written confirmation of the agreement reached- by phone and sent by
appellee indicated that shipment was to be by rail. Appellant did not acknowledge or return the confirmation form. Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 552
F.2d 1285, 1287-88 (8th Cir. 1977).
,,2. Id. at 1288.
3. Appellant contended that appellee had breached the contract by not supplying the
trucks to haul the grain and that it was therefore not entitled to delivery at the price
set by the February 1973 contract of $1.22 per bushel which appellee actually paid to appellant. Instead, appellant sought to recover the excess of market price at the time of the
deliveries (which was in excess of $3.00 per bushel) over the contract price of $1.22 per
bushel. Id. at 1289.

